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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XLIX, NO. 12: JUNE 5, 1952

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PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa., or 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subcription price (twenty-six numbers) is $5.25. The price of single numbers is 35 cents, double numbers, 60 cents.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 515 West 116th St., New York 27, N. Y. President, Ernest Nagel; Vice President, Herbert W. Schneider; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Iris Wilder Dean.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized March 11, 1952.

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357 pages; index $5.00

THE ANTIOCH PRESS, Yellow Springs, Ohio

VOLUME XLIX, No. 12 JUNE 5, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE ALLEGED PRIVACY OF EXPERIENCE

IT is a fashionable doctrine in twentieth-century philosophy that all so-called metaphysical assumptions are pseudo-assumptions resting upon abuses of language and that all problems are either problems of fact or problems of language. This doctrine is neither unambiguous nor of primary philosophical importance. It is not unambiguous because it is seldom made clear what should be understood by a metaphysical assumption or by a question of fact. And what has primary philosophical importance is not so much the vindication of a general statement about metaphysical assumptions but rather the clarification of the meaning of each single problem. Whether it be called metaphysical or not, the *name* of the problem does not matter; what matters is the *philosophical analysis of the problem*. Such an analysis *may*, indeed, show that the problem under analysis is not a genuine problem and that the very formulation of the problem is in fact an abuse of our language.

In this paper I intend to examine a particular thesis, a thesis which often is taken to be self-evident even though it also at times has been vigorously denied. I shall argue that the thesis is neither true nor false; that is, it is not a thesis at all but is a sentence violating the logical grammar of our language and if correctly stated is either utterly trivial or is an empirical proposition which would be true only under special circumstances. But being either a trivial statement or an empirical proposition the thesis has lost philosophical significance.

Roughly stated, the thesis proposed for analysis is that the experiences a person has are *his own*—not of course in the sense in which his money is said to be his own but in a peculiar sense of that phrase which seldom—if ever—is analyzed or stated but which implies that experiences are inaccessible to others than the owner of the experiences.

The classical formulation of the thesis was given by Berkeley. As is well known, Berkeley conceived of the external world as being not matter but *ideas*. Ideas, according to Berkeley, do not exist independent of the mind but only in perceiving minds, which implies that different minds perceive different ideas. In his *Three Dialogues* the following question is asked: "But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind.

Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly absurd?" Berkeley's answer to this question is tantamount to saying that no person can perceive *numerically* the same idea as another person, but several persons may perceive *qualitatively* identical ideas.

This viewpoint is still widely held and can be found stated and affirmed in many philosophical treatises of today.

As object for analysis I shall choose a statement by W. T. Stace. In *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* (Oxford, 1932), p. 67, he says: "I cannot experience anything except *my own* experience. I can see my red, but I can never see yours. I can feel a pain in my leg. But I can never feel the pain in your leg. I can feel my emotion, but not yours."

This statement is interesting for two reasons. In the first place because it so uncompromisingly commits itself to the privacy-thesis; and secondly, because it deals with three different kinds of experiences: the seeing of a red color, the feeling of a pain, and the feeling of an emotion. I shall deal with all three kinds of experiences in turn.

"I can see my red, but I can never see yours," so runs the first statement.

It is important, in the first place, to understand what kind of a statement we are confronted with. Is it a statement whose truth-value can be determined by any kind of observation or experiment? If it were it would be the same kind of statement as if I said "I can see your back but I can never see my own." This statement is easily verified. If I try to turn my head around in order to see my back I will discover that it is impossible. But there is nothing like this I can do in order to discover whether I can see your red. To be sure, it *could* be verified if we were dealing with two red spots or two red colors of which one was *my red* in the same sense in which a certain shirt may be said to be *my shirt* and the other red spot was *your red* in the same sense in which a shirt may be *your shirt* and not *my shirt*. I could then, in a given empirical situation, say that I could see my red but not your red. But it is obvious that this is not what is meant by the thesis that our experiences are private.

The statement "I can see my red, but I can never see yours" refers to situations where only *one* red spot is relevant. That is, despite the fact that I speak about both my red and your red there are not two red spots but only one. We are, in other words, seeing *the same* red spot. But if we say that nobody can see another person's red spot there is a sense in which they are *not* seeing the same red spot.

But what does it mean to say that they are not seeing the same red spot? It is sometimes stated this way: If you and I are seeing the same red spot there are two *experiences* of the spot, namely my experience of the red spot and your experience of the red spot; in other words, we speak about *my experience* and *your experience.* But even though it is perfectly legitimate, in certain contexts, to use the phrase "my experience," it may lead us astray and tempt us to formulate pseudo-assertions or to ask pseudo-questions. If, for instance, we are led to say, as Stace says, that I cannot experience anything except my own experience, we are abusing our language.

In order to see that this is the case it is necessary to know some of the syntactical rules applying to the word 'experience.' The word is used both as a verb and as a noun. We say both (1) "He is experiencing something" and (2) "He has an experience of something." That is to say, we cannot use the verb 'to experience' or the noun 'an experience' without its being used to express that *something* is experienced. It would be nonsense, of course, to say that I had an experience but that I did not experience anything. It is important to notice that the kinds of words which meaningfully can be substituted for the variable 'something' in the two sentences "He is experiencing something" and "He has an experience of something" are words like 'books,' 'the moon,' 'red colored objects,' etc., and that it will not be legitimate to substitute, for instance, 'his own experience.' Because if we do the word 'experience' comes to stand for both *that* which a person experiences and for the fact that he experiences something. And this is an incorrect use of the word 'experience.' In the first place because we thereby treat it as an object word, which means that we have created a new kind of entity. Besides objects like tables and chairs we now have a different kind of entities or objects labelled 'experiences.' In the second place, because to speak of an experience of an experience leads us into an infinite regress. If I cannot experience anything except my own experience and if every experience is an experience of something it follows that I only experience experiences of experiences and so forth. I cannot, for instance, state that I hear a man speaking in the other room. I can only state that I hear that I hear that I hear, etc., and will never get to the speaking man in the other room whom in fact I do hear.

The statement: "I cannot experience anything but my own experience" is thus neither true nor false but meaningless.

It may be argued, however, that this statement should not be taken to mean that the objects of our experiencings are our own

experiences, never another person's experiences, but that the fact that one person experiences something and the fact that another person experiences something are two different facts. But if this is the meaning of the statement then it is so trivial that it is hardly worth stating. It would be just as trivial as to say "All the property I have is my property." It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that this is not the intended meaning.

Let us now go back to the statement "I can see my red, but I can never see yours." We have seen, first of all, that it should not be taken as an empirical assertion like the assertion "I can see your back but I can never see my own back." Secondly, that if it is supposed to mean that I can see my own experience of red but never your experience of red it is nonsense; because even though there is a huge number of red objects I can see, there are no objects or entities called 'experiences of red,' and even if there were it would be nonsense to say that I could see them.

But, of course, just as the sentence "I cannot experience anything except my own experience" could be taken to be a trivial statement, so could the sentence "I can see my red, but I can never see yours." We can thus say: "The fact that I see the red spot and the fact that you see the red spot are two different facts." And this is, of course, a perfectly harmless, insignificant, and unmetaphysical sentence.

However, still another interpretation of the sentence in question is possible.

What is private, it is said, is of course not the object experienced nor is the privacy-thesis content with just asserting that my experience of something and your experience of something are two different facts. What is private is *the sensation* I have when I experience something. By sensation, then, is not meant anything like the scratching or pricking, the pleasant or painful sensation I can have in my right arm but something quite different. What it does mean, however, has been difficult to explain. If I am observing a red spot it is sometimes said that I have a *sensation* of the red spot. And what is meant by this is not simply that I can see the red spot, because that would be philosophically uninteresting, but that there exists a certain entity which is neither identical with the red spot I observe nor with the observing mind but is a *tertium quid* which in some sense or another is produced or generated by my nerve or brain processes.

In order to examine this opinion a little closer let us take two persons, A and B, both looking at a red spot. A asserts that there is no sensation in the sense described but only a red spot, while B asserts that there is such a sensation. How should A and B

go about settling their dispute? It is easily seen that however detailed their description is of all the facts, their descriptions will be identical. This means that they do not disagree about the factual situation. What A calls the red spot is, in other words, identical with what B calls the sensation of the red spot. Or, what A sees he calls a red spot and what B sees he calls a sensation of a red spot. But to speak about seeing a sensation of a red spot is fallacious language. Because if I hold that I do not see the red spot but only a sensation of the red spot I am forced, by the same theory, to say that I do not see the sensation of a red spot but a sensation of a sensation of a red spot and I involve myself in an infinite regress. It is consequently nonsensical to speak about the privacy of a sensation in this sense of sensation.

Even though I cannot go into a detailed discussion of the so-called 'argument from illusion' I shall say a few words about it. The argument is usually taken as strong evidence for the existence of a sensation, sense-datum, appearance, or whatever name we prefer to give to these entities. Thus, if I put a straight stick in water and see a bent stick it is thought necessary to speak about two entities, namely a straight stick and—not a bent stick—but an *appearance* of a bent stick.

Now, whatever force such an argument may have and however inadequately we may meet the argument there is one thing it cannot do. It cannot force us to speak about an experience of an experience or of seeing a sensation and the like. Nor can it force us to populate the world with entities called 'appearances' or 'sensations.' What it does force us to do, however, is to select our language with care precisely because we do not want to speak about seeing appearances. The argument from illusion, in other words, is an argument about logical grammar and not about facts.

What, then, is the language we ought to use to describe the straight stick half immerged in water? (1) If we say we see a bent stick it is patently false according to what we ordinarily mean by a bent stick; the stick is in fact straight. (2) If we say that there is a straight stick but that we see an appearance of a bent stick we are saying that there is an entity which is neither a straight stick nor a bent stick but something called an appearance of a bent stick. But to say that there is such an entity as an appearance of a bent stick which we see, is to be involved in an infinite regress, because the word 'appearance' already involves something which is seen. It would consequently lead us into saying that the appearance appears or that there is an appearance of an appearance, etc.

To say that there is an appearance is to say nothing more or

nothing less than that there is something which appears to be so and so. It is not to say that there is both this 'something' and, in addition to that, another 'something' called an 'appearance.' Consequently the correct way to speak about the straight stick half immerged in water is to say that there is a straight stick which looks as if it were bent. This way of speaking does not imply that there are two entities but, on the contrary, implies that there is only one entity, namely a straight stick.

Let us now analyze the statement: "I can feel a pain in my leg. But I can never feel the pain in your leg."

It is important to notice the difference between this statement and the following: "I can feel a stone in my shoe. But I can never feel a stone in your shoe." The latter statement involves the feeling of an object; to speak about "feeling an object" is the same as to speak about "observing or experiencing an object." To assert that I can never feel the stone in your shoe is an empirical assertion (and a false one); but, as we shall see, to assert that I can never feel your pain is not.

While I can say that I have experienced or observed a stone in my shoe I cannot say that I have experienced or observed a pain in my leg. A condition for using the verb 'to experience' or 'to observe' is that it would make sense to assume mistakes. What I maintain to be a stone in my shoe may turn out to be something else. But the pain I feel cannot meaningfully be assumed to be something else. If I maintain that I have a stone in my shoe I may be asked whether I am sure it really is a stone and not something else; but I could not be asked whether I have made sure that the pain I profess to have really is a pain.

Furthermore, the stone I feel I can seize with my fingers; I can feel whether it is smooth or rough and whether it is heavy or light. I can see its color and the size and can experience many other things about it; finally I can throw it away and leave it to its destiny. But it would be nonsense to say that I could do any such things with a pain. There are no objects, things, or the like, called 'pain.' I could never point with my finger and say "There is a pain" in the sense in which I can say "There is a spider." To say "There is a pain" means always something like "My right leg hurts" or "I have a pain right below my heart." But if we accept this it seems clear at once that it would be nonsense to say that I have a pain right below your heart or that you have a pain right below my heart. If anybody should assert such an absurdity we would not say that it was in fact impossible or that the world was not so constructed. We would say that he was not speaking correctly, that it was a violation of the rules of our language to

call a pain below *my* heart *his pain*. Instead of being a statement about the peculiarity of the world it is a statement about the rules of our language.

In other words, the statement "I can feel a pain in my leg. But I can never feel the pain in your leg" is a statement in the material mode of speech. It sounds like a statement about our abilities to feel or not to feel pain instead of a statement about the absurdity of speaking about feeling other people's pain.

Let us finally analyze the statement "I can feel my emotion but not yours." If we are to believe Ryle, and I think we should, then emotions are not *felt*. Emotions are not occurrences which take place in an alleged private world, not acts nor states but *propensities*, and it would be nonsense, of course, to speak about propensities as being either private or public; they are neither one nor the other. To be vain, for instance, is not to have special experiences or feelings called 'vanity feelings' but is to have a propensity to behave in a special way, namely to be apt to speak about one's own merits and to be silent about other people's merits and to do many other things, in short all the things we expect a vain man to do on the basis of which we judge him to be vain.

The questions I have dealt with in this paper have not been questions about the nature of things but have been about the correct way to ask questions. To say about a question that it cannot be asked is not to say that the question is too deep a question to be answered by human intelligence but is to say that it is no question at all—just as it is no question to ask whether I can experience your experiences. It is not a question but a meaningless expression made possible by sinning against our logical grammar.

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THE LOGIC OF EXPERIENCE

OUT of traditional philosophies, it is frequently noted, have grown the two modern empiricist movements which dominate the philosophic scene—American pragmatism and European positivism. But the radical empiricism which is in both of them is controverted by the realist tendencies in them, controverted, that is, by the necessity of radical empiricism of getting out of experience, of transcending experience. For positivism, this transcendence is only mental, not real; it is obtained by conventionalism and mere figments, such as "rules of correspondence" and the

"class of equivalent descriptions." For pragmatism, on the other hand, there is a more realistic method of transcendence, the method of action, by direct experimental intervention in nature. Hence, while there is undeniably an element of radical empiricism in both American pragmatism and European positivism, it is controverted in the former by its activity principle and in the latter by modern mathematical logic.

"Empiricism as an epistemological principle needs a complement on the logical side," writes H. Reichenbach. "It is a common feature of both pragmatism and positivism that they find this logical complement in nominalism, thus combining in their systems the empiricist trend with a line of development originating in logic. Out of this combination grew a specific version of empiricism in which the stress is laid, not so much, as in materialism, on an incorporation of the human mind into the physical world, as on a logical analysis of this physical world in terms of the world as it is originally given. The primitive world of concrete things, full of colours and sounds and feelings and emotions, stands at the basis of this construction; to this basis are reduced all the complex objects of scientific thought, the method of reduction being the nominalistic reduction of abstracta to concreta."[1]

The nominalistic reduction of abstracta to concreta is said to reveal to us a primary world of concrete experienced things, which is then said to constitute the "given" from which inquiry and reflection will start out. This nominalistic reductionism is implicit in pragmatism, also; for no sooner has pragmatism reduced the world to the qualitative interaction of experienced things, than it begins its process of reflection and inquiry and discovers that since reflection has started out from a primary world of experienced things it must eventually refer back to it. The result is that the knowledge gained from this process of inquiry is taken to be secondary to the more primary level of experience, and that knowledge, as a mode of access to reality, then becomes less significant than directly experienced qualities. Knowledge was henceforth said to be instrumental to the realization of ends of a more primary level of experience. The genuinely unique element in pragmatism, therefore, was that the success of knowledge in its instrumental role had the effect of depriving knowledge of any general significance as a mode of access to reality.

But nominalism and radical empiricism cannot, without violating their own principles, admit that the instrumental role of

[1] H. Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. I (Evanston, 1939), pp. 160–161.

knowledge is what confers upon it a transcendental significance. If, as some insist, "dream, insanity, and fantasy are natural products, as real as anything else in the world," why do we "prefer" scientific objects to these dreams, fantasies, and fictions of the wayward mind? It cannot be merely for their instrumental character, because, as William James has shown, these dreams and fantasies may be instrumental, as in the case of the psychotic, to the resolution of a problematic situation. But if we mean that scientific objects derive their instrumental character not merely from the immediate situation in which they function, and moreover not merely from the original problematic situation in which they arose, then we have as much as admitted that their pragmatic character is derived from the fact that the reality which they disclose transcends the immediate use to which they are put. Hence, it might be said, as a corrective to nominalism and radical empiricism, that knowledge is instrumental as means but transcendental as ends. Knowledge, in brief, is more than the merely nominative of the activities it discloses; it is more than a set of operations, a class of equivalent descriptions, or rules of correspondence.

The qualities of things in interaction, the empirical raw material from which, as Dewey indicated, inquiry and reflection must start out, and in which knowledge must terminate, was a description of a state of affairs which included the observer. Hence, the discussion about secondary and tertiary experienced qualities is one which excludes the observer from his own field or situation, and thus it was claimed that the qualities experienced in the field or situation were neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective. But this more inclusive situation means that we have transcended the immediately experienced qualities of things and passed to their relations; and this we can only do if we assume that we are not mere passive spectators separated from reality by a screen of phenomena, but are ourselves active participants in the process itself. Hence to pass from bare occurrence, from mere phenomena which in traditional empiricisms acted as a screen to cut us off from nature, to the relation of things in interaction is to become active ourselves as participants in the knowing process.

Once we include the observer in the field of observation, therefore, relations are disclosed and quality is attributed to an objective source. Traditional empiricism, in excluding the observer, was more and more inclined to attribute quality to a subjective source; but, at the same time, knowledge stood as a corrective, as a revelation of the objective world. Hence knowledge was in traditional empiricism a disclosure of reality, not merely an instru-

ment for controlling the passage from momentary and fleeting direct contacts with nature. The significant reversal of traditional empiricism which pragmatism represents is, accordingly, a thoroughly radical one; and its radicalism lies in its method of reducing all relations to their qualitative basis in experience. Hence the world as directly experienced becomes a qualitatively unique and plural world of things in interaction, in which henceforth knowledge plays merely an instrumental role and has no more than a pragmatic significance.

But the active involvement of the knower in the situation or field of his observation calls forth a different metaphysics, and requires that knowledge be conceived not merely as instrumental, as means, but as transcendental, as ends. It requires that, in so far as the relations disclosed in experience are instrumental to the resolution of problematic situations, they cannot be said to be merely subjective connections of thought, a mere verbal or mental convenience for connecting up the qualities that reside in the situation, but represent objectively real situations and connections. If therefore the knowledge situation is to be one which includes the knower, it must be said that the knower comes to know not merely the situation but himself as included in the situation; and this he cannot do unless directly experienced relations and qualities are taken as implicating a wider situation, unless the foreground of experience is corrected by the background of knowledge, unless, in brief, experience can be transcended. But this means that in the active causal relation of knowing, knowledge itself has not merely an instrumental role but a transcendental significance. It means that experience has its own dialectic, which, while it involves shifts, contradictions, and confusions at every stage, is in its essence progressive, and that the knowledge which is the product, or rather essence, of such experiences is the means of progressively transcending experience.

That the reality, that is, the truth and power, of thought is to be settled by practice, is a question which pragmatism will certainly admit; but it will not grant the corresponding admission that the knowledge of reality which is gained in practice transcends the problem to which it immediately pertains, because its radical empiricism contradicts the fundamental truth of its pragmatism, and because to make such an admission would transform the instrumental theory of knowledge into a transcendental theory of knowledge; it would destroy radical empiricism for the sake of a transcendental realism. Hence the enduring truth of pragmatism is that action is a necessity involved not only in the judgment of the facts but in the determination of the value of the facts. The en-

during truth of idealism is that facts are only data which must be placed in a context of meaning before we can make judgments about them. The enduring truth of realism is that our facts and data must have a structure of their own, must form a field or system of interconnections, before our judgments can have relevance to the reality they are designed to interpret. Hence a transcendental realism requires that the object of knowledge should function both as the product of inquiry and as the means of further inquiry; it requires that both knowing and the known enter into the resolution of problematic situations; and that the knowledge which is obtained in practice be regarded both as instrumental, as means, and as transcendental, as ends, in the ongoing process in which it functions.

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HEIDEGGER'S "BEING"

WHEN we ask what Being is, how it can be characterized and known, we find in Martin Heidegger's thought as yet no full or satisfactory answer. As everyone knows, he has been unable to complete the second half of *Sein und Zeit*, of which the published part was only preparatory, an analysis of the human way of being. When he came to describe Being as such, he laments, the traditional language of metaphysics failed him. Since the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, he has brought out essays only, some of them greatly suggestive of what may be his answer to the question: What is Being? But Heidegger is still searching and his definitive work is yet to come. The task at all events, he seems to suggest, is not for one man or one generation. He wishes to be only a direction-giver, and an initiator. Nevertheless, in the already published work, particularly in the late essays, Heidegger has succeeded in characterizing Being in an indirect and tentative way, in telling us also what are false ways of understanding it.

First of all, Heidegger is certain that Being is nothing mysterious, requiring special competence or revealed only to initiates. On the contrary, it is supremely simple, too simple really for our complex modern consciousness to grasp. Only those ingenuous souls who have stripped away, or never possessed, the superfluities of thought and emotion know what it is to stand in the light of Being. They have a way of experiencing and thinking in a more direct and immediate way, of relating themselves to the whole in more

open and self-evident fashion. Their thinking is, in his untranslatable phrase, *anfänglicher* than that of less simple people. To them Being is nearer than any existent thing, any object, yet paradoxically it is far off, too, since it is endless and inexhaustible.

In the second place, Being is through and through temporal. Here Heidegger most clearly departs from the Greek philosophers from whom he has learned so much. For Being in the Greek tradition came to be understood as substance, *ousia*, and substance in turn was equated with *parousia*, presence. That which is truly present is the enduring, the unchanging, to which both past and future are irrelevant. So Being became in Plato, Aristotle, and the later Christian philosophy identified with the timeless and supreme, and ontology passed into theology. Heidegger keeps clear of this traditional pattern. For him Being is neither God nor a world-ground in the idealist German tradition. Temporality is of its very essence. And there is no dualism in his thought of reality and appearance, of unchanging form and protean matter.

Thirdly, Being is objective to man; it exists apart from him. The human way of being is only one sort, and is enveloped by the larger reality. Subjectivism or anthropocentrism is the great sin of modern thought, the beginnings of which Heidegger traces to Plato and Aristotle. On this issue, he has been forced to dissociate himself from his fellow existentialists to the point of renouncing the label itself. Sartre's dictum that existence precedes essence is as remote as may be from Heidegger's ontological realism. As he puts it in the letter on Humanism: "Man is not the lord of existing things. Man is the shepherd of Being."[1] Like that of the shepherd, man's true dignity consists in his function of taking care of, of being a protector and a guardian. His being is care (*Sorge*) in the comprehensive sense of the term. Man does not create Being, but he is responsible for it since, without his thinking and remembering, Being has no illumination, no voice, no word.

Though man finds himself *in Being* and does not create it, nevertheless Being is not properly grasped by the categories of Nature. For Nature, which Heidegger likes to call *das Vorhandene*, is also only a part of Being, something within the whole or in Being. Nature's ontological status is not prior to man's. Heidegger dissents from one of the oldest and most established propositions of Western thought: that man is a rational animal. He is neither animal nor reason in the received Aristotelian sense. It has been the great error of most previous metaphysicians, Heid-

[1] *Ueber den Humanismus*, p. 29.

egger thinks, to conceive man as a creature of nature with consciousness and thinking as something added to him, really superimposed on him. This has led us falsely to conceive Being in terms of natural categories, quantity, quality, and the like, and to believe that thereby we were exhausting the nature of the real. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the substance of man is neither reason nor animality. It is his capacity to stand out from Being. Man's essence is found in his *ex-sistence*. Since this aspect of Heidegger's thought has been discussed, even out of relation to its importance, we need say nothing more about it here.

But we may well ask: How is Being discovered and illuminated? And how can we hold fast to it and preserve it, when we do penetrate to the truth of Being? In his answers to these questions Heidegger seems uncommonly suggestive and original. To put the answers in a sentence: Being can be discovered through the investigation of, the listening to, and meditating upon the language of genuine thinkers and poets. Language is conceived by Heidegger in a way directly contrary to most modern thinking. It is no mere tool or instrument, nor does its essence consist entirely in being a means of transmitting information. Language is the supreme event of human existence because it enables man, in the words of the poet Hölderlin, "to affirm what he is."[2]

Through the word, through conversation, men can bring the existent into the open and preserve it in potential form for later generations. Language is "the house of Being," Heidegger frequently asserts. Or again, "Being comes, self-illuminatingly, into language." His meaning is that language is at its birth a genuine revelation of reality, that words arise from an original experience of the cosmos. They are not chance creations nor utilitarian counters, but on the contrary arise from a simple and primary encounter with things as they are. Used by people who have not shared adequately in such experience, however, their true meaning becomes blunted, veiled, forgotten. Language tends constantly toward decadence and degeneration. The most significant event of human experience, it is also the most dangerous of possessions, insofar as it can be called a possession at all. Hence the thinker who would illuminate Being must dig down through the accumulations of meaning and vague connotations of a word to reach the original truth it embodies. Heidegger seeks to penetrate into the utmost recesses of his native German and classical Greek in order

[2] For Heidegger's best thoughts on language, see the essays *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* and *Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*.

to discover what Being is. Sometimes he finds it necessary to create words which should exist, he thinks, as derivatives of an original root word. This practice of returning to the root meanings of words, using archaic terms, and creating new word combinations has helped to make his work inaccessible to many readers, but at the same time it is the essential core of his method of philosophizing.

Indeed, in his essay on *The Essence of Truth*, we see that this method is inseparable from his ontology. The word "truth" in its Greek form *aletheia* means an "uncovering," a disclosure of what is covered up, concealed, mysterious. Our words "discovery" and "revelation" have similar root meaning. Truth is a lifting of the cover or veil of what really exists, what *is*. Man in his common state is a creature for whom the nature of things is hidden, enveloped in darkness and mystery. His efforts as a truth-seeker are directed toward wresting from the beings around him, human and non-human, their secret. He must see them as they are in themselves and not merely as they are for him. This is forever difficult because it is the nature of things to be hidden and unrevealed, as it is the usual state of man to be blind to what is most near and evident. Hence, it is the never-ending task of poets and thinkers to retrieve truth from the void of forgetfulness, to bring it again into the light of the word.

The history of philosophy is consequently seen in a new perspective by Heidegger.[3] Philosophy is not something distinct from its history, or at least philosophizing is possible only in the context of the history of philosophy. Heidegger rejects the Hegelian notion that the history of thought is a phenomenology of spirit in which previous stages are constantly superseded by more adequate, profounder ideas of the real. In fact, he sometimes seems to feel that there is a reverse kind of process, that the history of Western philosophy has been a gradual forgetting of the insights of the earliest thinkers. Original thinking, he writes somewhere, came to an end when philosophy began to be separated into logic, ethics, physics, etc. The earliest thinkers did not even use the term "philosophy" for thinking. It seems to follow that the pre-Socratics, particularly Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, were closer to the truth of Being than Plato, Aristotle, and the moderns. Such early thinkers conceived the relation of man to the whole more directly, with less exaggeration of the hu-

[3] Cf. Wilhelm Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in the volume, *Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, for a detailed and interesting discussion of this matter.

man role; they possessed a vision of the unity and totality of Being that their more burdened and sophisticated successors lost.

This extreme emphasis is hardly characteristic of Heidegger's practice, however, in dealing with the history of Western philosophy. He has for the whole of it a more sensitive ear than do most creative thinkers. But for him philosophy does not advance, as do particular branches of learning or science. Philosophy is not by any means a body of knowledge, a subject of study or specialization. It is rather a way man grasps the meaning of his existence as a whole and the way he relates himself to the totality of things. In other words, philosophy is an attempt to create in the vast wilderness of Being a clearing and to make a home there, built from language and thought. Essential thinkers thus are always at work on the same task. Though the relations of existent beings within the whole are grasped in manifold ways, the main task confronts every thinker afresh. He must always begin at the beginning, so to speak. The history of thought, insofar as it moves at all, moves really through a cycle of remembrance and forgetting. Thinking is remembrance, in Heidegger's usage of the term, and remembrance involves searching the language of the past with the aim of penetrating all dimensions of meaning contained therein.

Interpretation, then, is not only a transporting oneself back into the era out of which the thought arose and attempting to understand the words and ideas as they were conceived by the philosopher in question. This archaeological task is inescapable, but it is only the starting point. We have then to develop the implications of those words and ideas, to understand them in the light of other men's thoughts and words including our own. This involves an enrichment of meaning that may not be truer than the conception of Being the original thinker possessed, but it enables us to communicate to our age and people. Though man's true relation to Being is essentially unchanging, every thinker must grasp this in his own way. There is no grasping it at all otherwise. And past thinkers are dependent upon us and our interpretation, for the preservation of their meaning and truth. They must be made contemporary in order for us to understand the future.

Philosophic thinking or remembering is not the only way to reveal the many facets of Being. Of late years Heidegger has been preoccupied with the function and role of artists, especially poets, in the rediscovery of Being. In published essays on this theme, he feels that the poet and thinker are near kindred, however

separated they may be in temperament and approach. Their goal is the same. In Hölderlin's lines, which Heidegger likes to quote, "they dwell near to one another, on mountains farthest apart." If the thinker's mission is to elucidate Being, it is the poet's "to name what is holy." The poet is a giver of names; he is able more than other men to say what things are. Through the gift of language, of which the genuine poet has an intense awareness, he is peculiarly able to stand in the open, to participate in Being, and to make it manifest to other men.

Heidegger does not look to poetry for vague, mystical or mythical ideas nor for emotional inspiration. In a sense, he is upholding the so-called "revelation theory" of art, but with a difference. Artists are messengers, true descendants of the Greek god Hermes. Great poets like Hölderlin, Rilke, the Greek dramatists are not concerned with a private world of their own imagining, nor content merely to capture beauty in language. They are seekers of objective truth. They bring to mankind a new conception of the divine. They give names to that which other men could not experience without the naming. The names are not only symbols, shorthand of their experience; they *are* their experience. And men learn from the poets to live in new dimensions of the real. As Hölderlin put it, "man dwells poetically on this earth." The poet's function, Heidegger thinks, is to make us truly aware of this poetical dwelling.

The gods the poets name are a people's conception of that which is highest and most real about their lives. By their peculiar sensitiveness the poets know how to unite the commonplace with the noble. They transmute the ordinary by showing its place in the scheme of Being, by linking it up to the highest reality. To dwell poetically on earth is to find in the simple and homely things of every-day experience the divine and the holy. Unlike the thinker, the poet is not concerned with analysis nor the rigorous discipline of thought. His is no complete or synoptic view. But absorbed as he is with seeing and designating the higher reaches of Being, with giving names that transform the way man dwells here on earth, he is not inferior to the thinker in disclosing the nature of the existent.

What practical bearing and relevance has this ontology? Heidegger's unfriendly critics are certain that it has little, and even Jaspers finds it abstract and devoid of any guidance for the improvement and enrichment of individual life. One critic in a strong attack on the pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger's philosophy writes typically as follows:

His *Dasein* does not know of any *concupiscentia*, of any instinct, of any toothache. Very soon we will see that it knows just as little of *caritas* or friendliness or duties, or the state.[4]

Heidegger has something to say of this criticism toward the end of the essay *On Humanism*, in answer to the query of his French friend about the connection of his ontology with a possible ethic. To an extent, his answer is ambiguous, as throughout his writings he seems to take an ambivalent position toward this question. On the one hand, he assumes a superior tone toward practice and the problems of ethics. This ontology, he writes in effect, has no practical consequences; this thought is prior to all distinctions between theory and practice. The attitude seems very like that of Aristotle, who was convinced that metaphysics was the best and noblest of all studies precisely because it was of no practical use.

Heidegger's belief is that the question of values can be rightly approached only in the larger context of metaphysics. Ethics properly derives from a metaphysics as a metaphysics derives from fundamental ontology. He considers his task to be a prior one, a necessary laying of the foundation, the groundwork for later scaffolding. The nature of Being is so unknown, so covered up and forgotten today, that the question of practice must await its clarification. Seek ye first the kingdom of Being, he says in effect, and all these things shall be added unto you.

Furthermore, Heidegger has, as already suggested, great antagonism toward subjectivism in any form. All valuing is a subjectifying in the sense that it is a judging of everything according to what advantage or interest it has for us as human creatures. Even God Himself has come to be interpreted by the present day merely as the highest human value. This obsession with giving a value to everything in heaven and earth is for Heidegger the greatest blasphemy, the best sign of total forgetfulness of Being. Values are to be derived from Being, not the reverse; ontology is not the handmaiden of value theory. This strong antagonism toward valuing has led him to deny in sharp terms that his distinctions in *Sein und Zeit*, such as the "fallen" state of *das Man* and the other *existentialia* of human existence, have any ethical relevance. Anthropologists and psychologists who claim to have profited greatly from his work are anathematized by him.

Nevertheless, it seems apparent to me that Heidegger's on-

[4] Guenther Stern (Anders), "The Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 8, p. 349.

tology does have, implicitly at least, a very great bearing upon practice. Though his thinking has no immediate connection with action, it arises out of the pressing needs of our age and is guided by the search for a stable ground upon which modern people can reorient themselves. Heidegger is surely very much concerned with the imminent threat of nihilism, the loss of all faith and all sense of direction, which plagues our time. Self-alienation and the homelessness of man have become, he writes, the fate of millions. Perplexity of spirit grows with the dehumanization of man by our technological society. His solution for this deranged state of modern life is more radical and far-reaching than many can see. The crisis of our day has causes that go back far and deep into our heritage. Therapy must accordingly be of a thoroughgoing, reformatory sort. This makes Heidegger's work, though seeming to be abstract and remote, much less time-bound and culturally relative than the work of his contemporary existentialists.

It is to the sense of helplessness and lostness that Heidegger's philosophy seeks in its own peculiar fashion to minister. Humanism, in its usual meaning, underestimates the dignity of man, the true dignity which derives from a voluntary recognition of his dependence upon and involvement in a wider and greater reality than the human. Heidegger seeks to relate men again to the sources of their being, to give them something they can revere. It is a great error to call Heidegger atheistic. Although his thought is agnostic, as philosophy insofar as it is a rational inquiry must be, he has explicitly stated that his fundamental ontology provides an adequate basis upon which an inquiry about God's relationship to man may be conducted. Though Heidegger would not have man revere Being with traditional religious piety, he would have him live and move with that ever present consciousness of its reality that the shepherd has for his sheep, the skilled laborer for his material, the artist for his masterpiece. It is a this-worldly piety he wishes to instil; not a piety directed toward Nature, such as Santayana likes, but piety directed toward present and future possibilities of man in Being. It is the piety of care and concern for the existent in its fullest scope. This piety need not be condemned as conservative, since the concern for Being is future-directed and Being itself is rife with ideal possibilities.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Geschichte der Philosophie. Erster Band. *Die alte Welt. Das christlich-germanische Mittelalter.* 2. verbesserte und umgearbeitete Auflage. KURT SCHILLING. München/Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag. 1951. 455 pp.

The book under review is the first volume of a revised two-volume history of philosophy, the first edition of which appeared in 1943–1944. It is not to be confused with a short one-volume history of philosophy by the same author which was reviewed in Volume XLVII (1950), pp. 559–560, of this JOURNAL. The author is professor of philosophy at the University of Munich.

The book surveys the whole span of ancient and medieval philosophy, but detailed attention is given to a few major figures: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas. Chapters dealing with the historical background introduce the major periods in philosophy. The general introduction discusses both the nature of philosophy and the function of the history of philosophy. A useful bibliography (with occasional misspellings) that aims to supplement Ueberweg for the years after 1926 is found in the back of the book.

In dividing the periods of philosophy the author argues for the essential similarity of Plato and Aristotle. Both to him are this-worldly, concerned with the understanding of nature and the mastery of life in society. The dividing point comes for him, following Spengler, with what he calls the age of the transcendent God. Plotinus as a major representative of that age is said to have more in common with St. Augustine than with Plato.

Within this framework the author does not offer much that is novel, but his presentation, not directed to professional philosophers alone, often has the advantage of clarity and of giving at least a few major problems a more extended treatment. Reservations must be made in regard to a recurrent emphasis on alleged native national endowments and to characterizing the whole medieval world as "Christian-Germanic." It is the author's intention to have the history of philosophy serve the purposes of contemporary philosophizing and to relate philosophy to the historical context. Hence the introductory historical chapters are meant to be intimately related to the philosophical discussions. But it is characteristic that the historical chapters lack the psychological-sociological-economic dimension that has become a vital aspect of American historiography. The author's thinking therefore moves

in the orbit of *Lebensphilosophie* and measures the gap between *Geist* and *culture* as fundamental philosophic concepts.

JOSEPH KATZ

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Immanuel Kant. Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie. GOTTFRIED MARTIN. Köln: Kölner Universitätsverlag. 1951. 244 pp.

The first word in the subtitle of this book gives the character of the whole. Gottfried Martin, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cologne, attempts to read the Kant corpus, especially the *Critique of Pure Reason,* as ontology. Even the first part of the book, which is devoted to *Wissenschaftstheorie,* is concerned with the being of nature, with its categorical analysis in Aristotelian almost as much as in Kantian terms. Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Leibniz are seen as providing the ontological framework for Kant's thought; and Martin achieves the probably unique distinction of writing over 200 pages about Kant without once mentioning Hume or even Hume's problem.

The consequence of this somewhat unusual approach to Kant is a very interesting book in which many of Kant's specific theses appear in an uncustomary context and in a language which Kant himself seldom used. This is all to the good, and it bears out the author's remark, "Each new interpretation is only a new proof of the inexhaustibility of the Kantian thought." Nevertheless, it must be confessed that this treatment necessarily minimizes the novel, the revolutionary, and the truly original in the work of Kant. Kant's distinction as a thinker is not based upon his ontology, and in one place Martin himself characteristically says *"dass Kant hier nicht die letzte Subtilität der ontologischen Fragestellung erreicht hat"* (p. 229). Moreover, exactly the same problems that trouble other interpreters of Kant—e.g., those of the relation of appearances to things in themselves, of freedom to natural necessity, of the empirical to the transcendental self, of the thinking to the moral self, of God to world, of purpose to natural necessity—are left almost exactly as they were before. Changing the perspective from *Wissenschaftstheorie* to *Seinstheorie* does not help to bridge the chasms which appeared to Kant himself to be unbridgeable. I am not sure that this is a ground for criticism of an ontological rendering of Kant, for I should be suspicious of any interpretation of a philosopher which answered questions which the philosopher himself declared to be unanswerable. But Martin, like the late Nicolai Hartmann, sometimes seems to me to mistake the careful statement of a fundamental problem with its

solution, and like Hartmann he refers to the admission of unresolved antinomic relationships as an "aporetic solution." Still, some of these *aporiai* are depicted in a very suggestive manner, with formulations that are sound but unusual in the more conventionally oriented interpretations. For instance, Martin aptly discerns a "Platonic ontology" in the second *Critique* in contrast to Aristotelian and nominalistic ontologies in the first. To be sure this sounds like a one-sided interpretation of the doctrine of ideas in both Kant and Plato, but Martin is aware of the qualifications necessary to make it defensible, and with these qualifications it is tenable.

Martin decides in favor of Cohen (as against Reich) with respect to the alleged analytical character of formal logic and its consequent inadequacy as a source of forms of judgment to be used in the metaphysical deduction. Martin is familiar with the work of H. J. Paton; in this case it seems to me that he should have taken account of Paton's to me definitive refutation of this view.

The author expresses his principal indebtedness to the works of Heimsoeth. He is in sharp opposition to the attempts of Paulsen, Krueger, and Max Wundt to see Kant as a speculative metaphysician in spite of himself, and also to the opposite interpretations of the older Marburg school.

Physically the book is more attractive than most post-war German publications in philosophy. I noticed only one typographical error and only one slip of the pen: on page 26, for *natürlichen* read *lebendigen*.

LEWIS WHITE BECK

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Le origini del pensiero di Benedetto Croce. MARIO CORSI. Firenze: La Nuova Italia. 1951. vii, 183 pp. (Biblioteca di cultura, 37.) L. 700.

Croce's philosophical position to which, in its definitive form, he has himself assigned the name "storicismo assoluto," is a construction of arresting power. At the same time, both because of Croce's philosophical "style," which is somewhat opaque, synthetic rather than analytic, and because of the inherent character of his doctrine, it is a position whose genesis and formation must be known before its power may be appreciated. For this reason the present work of Mario Corsi will contribute much to the understanding and evaluation of his subject.

Corsi wisely defines at the very outset of his study the sense in which he employs the term "origins," and, it may be remarked,

the definition is itself Crocean in inspiration. For Corsi understands by origins, not the external conditionings of Croce's thought, nor the "sources" it might be thought to have in philosophers who preceded him and in the philosophical tradition to which he allied himself, but simply "the manner in which the Neapolitan philosopher has arrived, by way of his diverse interests and writings, at the works of his first maturity." The concept of origins is thus immanentized in a manner wholly Crocean; at the same time, it serves to delineate the task and the method of the study both firmly and concretely.

The method of the study, as determined by this definition of origins, is necessarily philology; that is to say, Corsi seeks to evoke or re-evoke the first transactions of Crocean speculation directly from the records. From this point of view alone the work is rich, for it explores and synthesizes the early writings of Croce with understanding and economy. The philology here at work, however, is precisely the philology which Croce, following Vico, identifies with philosophy, for the real worth of Corsi's study appears in his ability to grasp in the written record the movement of a mind and spirit. His exegesis, consequently, is never literal or heavy, but rather at every point lightened and guided by sympathetic insight.

Corsi sets as the term of his study the works of the first maturity of Croce. These he identifies concretely as the works in which the first form of Crocean historicism was determined in itself, employed as the methodological principle of historiographic investigations, and defended and contrasted with alternate philosophical positions. The first maturity of Crocean historicism was reached by the establishment and the critical dissolution of the thesis of the "reduction of history under the general concept of art," and its replacement by the concept of history as the concrete synthesis of universal and particular. This latter concept inspired the works of Croce's first maturity as a literary critic, as a theoretician and historian of esthetics, and as an historian of culture. It receives its polemical restatement in Croce's writing on Marxianism. Here, placing directly in opposition to each other dialectical materialism and his own historicism, Croce is able to define with a clarity heretofore unmatched the salient, or spiritualistic, values of his own insight; a development which led in turn to the projection of the "Philosophy of Spirit" in its full conception and proportions.

Corsi's essay will surely take its place beside the other works, such as Mautino's work on Croce's political theory and Garbari's investigation into the first form of the Crocean esthetics, as a pri-

mary document for the study of the formation of Crocean historicism.

A. Robert Caponigri
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Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia. A Historical and Critical Survey. Aage Henriksen. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 1950. 160 pp. (Publications of the Kierkegaard Society, Copenhagen, Vol. I.) $3.25.

In this historical and critical survey of the methods and results of Kierkegaardian studies in Scandinavia during the past one hundred years, Aage Henriksen notes general trends that identify three fairly distinct periods. Omitting the earliest of these, which consisted mainly in polemics—in part very violent—sustained by the ecclesiastical circles that were answering even more violent attacks on the established church, he concentrates on the shift to the objective approach made possible by a first and later by a second edition of the writings of Sören Kierkegaard.

To the distinguished critic Georg Brandes goes the credit of pioneering in the use of such material methodically, but even he and Höffding, P. A. Heiberg, Drachmann, and other contemporaries combined research and conviction so equally that theirs is here set down as a semi-agitatorial age. When a second edition of the Papers was under way the wealth of additional material resulted in revisions by Heiberg and Drachmann and studies by Brandt, Brix, Vilhelm Andersen, Bohlin, Hohlenberg, and at least a dozen other investigators who together have formed our recent period of research that "may with some reserve be called sober."

Mr. Henriksen's aim has been one of giving a full and loyal account of the methods and results by means of generous quotations and summaries, highly welcome because many of them now first appear in an English translation. Even the most objective of the scholars under survey contribute a human, subjective note. Observing this, the author frankly admits that he himself is more familiar with literary history than with theological and psychiatric concepts. His own results, as he examines and selects from those who set Kierkegaard the poet-philosopher against his native Danish literary and humanistic context, are possibly even more valuable than he realizes.

For Kierkegaardian research, judging by much of the vocabulary in these pages, has become largely a problem of mathematical contours, with the enigma of personality intensified, with the "earthquake" over-interpreted, with the "secret" still a secret. But how about it? Just how "sober" is all this research of recent decades? Apply the trusted method of cancellation to a

contradictory conglomerate of nouns and adjectives and other descriptive terms like the following that are assembled here as descriptive of Sören Kierkegaard and his states of mind and soul: an alloy, a saint, a hero, a backward-looking prophet, un-Christian and un-Lutheran, victim of depressive dread, labyrinthine nature, schizoid dispositions, demoniacal humor, religiously inspired, extroverted affectivity, morbidness, lack of biological compulsions, non-pycnic build, paradigmatic soundness with pathological fluctuations, aesthete, schizothymic nature, manic-depressive psychosis of endogenous origin, insanity trend, syntonic nature, manic exaltation. Apply the method of cancellation, and what remains?

Fortunately there does remain something vitally sound and important gleaned from other material in this volume. Georg Brandes in his day was accused of over-simplification because he ignored or was unfamiliar with the whole Kierkegaard story. Now, with the Henriksen findings at hand, supplemented with some invaluable biographical and other material by British and American writers, we can retell the simple story of Sören Kierkegaard who, schooled by his father's rigorous Wolffian discipline, decided to apply the momentous "you *can* what you *will*," and, having done so, charter both his life and work consciously around the organizing thought of pointing out, without authority, the Christianity of the New Testament. So very necessary is now this proposed venture of retelling that the prospect alone of taking the "leap," to use Kierkegaardian language, is itself exhilarating.

ALMA LUISE OLSON
LINDSBORG, KANSAS

Vilhelm Ekelund och Nietzsche. ROLF EKMAN. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1951. 144 pp. Kr. 9:-.

In the four relatively detached papers of this volume Rolf Ekman clearly has in mind a Scandinavian reading public that knows Vilhelm Ekelund, subject of lively controversy, better than it knows Nietzsche. Lengthy quotations from the latter delay the introduction to the arresting figure of the Swedish poet and philosopher, who revealed early Nietzschean influence but later emerged as an independent thinker with a philosophy of his own. After turning out seven volumes of verse within a half-dozen years he renounced further expression in the form of lyrics, which by their very intensity of sensations threatened his personality with complete collapse, and thereafter used the medium of aphorisms and the philosophical essay.

Opposed, like Nietzsche, to thinking and learning for its own sake, he stressed existentialism, with experience and self-realization

and soundness of body, mind, and soul as foremost aims. He invented a cryptic language, though his aphorisms are elusive enough in their resemblance to Emerson, whom he admired. He was anti-utilitarian, asocial, anti-romantic, anti-Christian and Christian morals as expressed in a secular environment. Consequently his way out and up—not his "escape"—came through solitude and leanings toward mysticism. Direct association with others intensified his loneliness, but in solitude he experienced the real and ideal communion with fellow men. He sought spiritual communion with the great of ages long since past. The day that you purify solitude and convert it into light, he reflects, will become both day and light for others. Association with the past, acquired through solitude—and such solitude!—he considers the best investment he ever made.

Throughout these pages Rolf Ekman makes detailed and somewhat repetitious comparisons and contrasts, also indulging in or slipping into anachronism when something in *Also sprach Zarathustra* reminds him of the matured Ekelund. The brief summaries of Ekelund's emphasis on *Metron,* moderation, and on mental equilibrium and mildness, are highly clarifying, as well as the mapping of an abyss between Nietzsche's will to power and Ekelund's ideal of lowliness and the cryptic meanings of "hunger" and "poverty."

Some lines from an Ekelund lyric are cited. Even more vivid are the seven lines quoted by E. N. Tigerstedt in his recent valuable and interesting *History of Swedish Literature,* where many illuminating comments help to place Vilhelm Ekelund as an important pioneer in modern Swedish humanistic and other literary and philosophic thought and life.

ALMA LUISE OLSON
LINDSBORG, KANSAS

Science and the Goals of Man: a Study in Semantic Orientation. ANATOL RAPOPORT. Foreword by S. I. Hayakawa. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950. xxviii, 262 pp. $3.50.

Inasmuch as this book recommends the production, by proper semantic orientation, of "culture-studying cultures," and dislikes war-mongering slogans and race prejudice, and tries to find a connection between being a good scientist and being a good man, one may safely say that its objectives are worthy. But the method of arguing these theses takes the virtue out of these pages. Any serious and helpful examination of the foundations of value-judgments and desire to find their criteria of objectivity would have at least mentioned Stevenson and Dewey. Only Korzybski is mentioned. Most valuations are made out to be bestial grunts or

"about the inside" of the persons making them, and just how a reliable or objective value-judgment differs from these is never made clear except by association with better "maps" which are also inside our nervous systems. But a good map, and its correspondence with the external world of nothing but sub-microscopic physical particles, is definitive of truth and descriptive knowledge, not of normative judgment. The author leaves us in the dark as to how a preference for better maps (more adequate factual descriptions) is connected with morality (the German scientists had a strong preference for such things, so do the Russian, so do we), or what makes such a preference morally obligatory. The over-all impression that the reader gets about value terms, including camouflaged ones like "Americanism" and its opposite, is that they are all about subjective states only, and generally dangerous ones, "in" the users of the terms. The saving power of knowledge, extended and deepened, must be granted, but we here have no adequate analysis of how this is the case.

Then there is the well-known Korzybskian tirade against Aristotle's logic and Aristotelianism generally. This is a good way to establish a cult, with just enough of an air of esotericism to capture the confidence of a mind demanding knowledge but not liberally educated enough to distinguish the spurious from the genuine brand. The author is aware, and says so, that "A is A" is formally correct and that he does not himself assert the contradictory of this. In this respect, there is nothing wrong with Aristotelian logic, he says. It is the *metaphysics* of Aristotle that induces the unfortunate identifications of different things. Yet he deplores the pernicious influence of the word "is," with its unholy copulations in the subject-predicate logic. Poor Aristotle, who was, after all, only meaning to do a bit of formal logic, at least in the Organon, and who certainly did not confer upon "is" such pernicious powers as the Korzybskians find in it. Also, the strange use of "abstraction" recurs here. Wendell Johnson's correction of Korzybski's levels of abstraction is accepted. What you see by means of a microscope is the "first order" abstraction. Second order abstractions are the objects of unaided sense-perception. And so on up to thought-levels with something more being left out at each level as you go up to the more abstract. The rule is that the higher orders shall be checked by, or under the control of, the lower or less abstract ones. But see what results from this: if physico-mathematical thinking is on a very high level of abstraction (and it quite certainly is), and if this serves as a corrective for sense-perception of all kinds (the Korzybskians require this, by making the physical particles it discloses the ultimate court

of appeal), then, in the final analysis, thought controls or corrects for perception, not the other way around. And yet the author talks as if fresh sense-perceptions, with their greater concreteness and particularity, should legitimize thinking on any higher level of abstraction.

But all this is old hat—which, however, is no deterrent to a school philosophy getting its nurture, not from the important concept of some connection between science and sanity, but from the meager verbalization of it into a slogan.

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NEW BOOKS

MEAD, HUNTER: *An Introduction to Aesthetics.* New York: The Ronald Press Company. [1952.] vii, 307 pp. $4.00.

MEULEN, JAN VAN DER: *Magdalena Åbi und Kant, oder Das unendliche Urteil.* Meisenheim/Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain. 1951. 50 pp. (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung. Heft 3.) DM 3.50.

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MOORE, CHARLES A., ed.: *Essays in East-West Philosophy; an Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis.* Edited and with an Introduction by Charles A. Moore. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1951. xii, 467 pp. $5.00.

Papers read at the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949.

Charles A. Moore: Introduction: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis.—Part I. Methodology. *Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki:* Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy. *E. R. Hughes:* Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy. *Dhirendra Mohan Datta:* Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy. *Swami Nikhilananda:* Concentration and Meditation as Methods in Indian Philosophy. *Edwin A. Burtt:* Basic Problems of Method in Harmonizing Eastern and Western Philosophy. *William Ray Dennes:* Empirico-Naturalism and World Understanding. *Filmer S. C. Northrop:* Methodology and Epistemology, Oriental and Occidental.—Part II. Metaphysics. *Wing-tsit Chan:* Syntheses in Chinese Metaphysics. *Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera:* Some Aspects of Reality as Taught by Theravāda (Hīnayāna) Buddhism. *Shinsho Hanayama:* Buddhism of the One Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna). *P. T. Raju:* Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy. *Swami Nikhilananda:* The Nature of Brahman in the Upanisads—The Advaita View. *John Wild:* Certain Basic Concepts of Western Realism and Their Relation to Oriental Thought. *George P. Conger:* Integration. *Wilmon Henry Sheldon:*

Main Contrasts between Eastern and Western Philosophy.—Part III. Ethics and Social Philosophy. *Y. P. Mei:* The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy. *T. M. P. Mahadevan:* The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy. *C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar:* The Philosophical Basis of Indian Legal and Social Systems. *Charles Morris:* Comparative Strength of Life-Ideals in Eastern and Western Cultures. *Filmer S. C. Northrop:* The Theory of Types and the Verification of Ethical Theories. *Cornelius Krusé:* Western Theories of Value. *Charles A. Moore:* Metaphysics and Ethics in East and West.—Part IV. Conclusions and Prospects. Reports of the Conference Seminars.

MOSTOWSKI, ANDRZEJ: *Sentences Undecidable in Formalized Arithmetic; an Exposition of the Theory of Kurt Gödel.* Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. 1952. viii, 117 pp. (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. L. E. J. Brouwer, E. W. Beth, A. Heyting, Editors.) Paper. Fl. 12.- ($3.25).

MUKERJEE, RADHAKAMAL: *The Dynamics of Morals; a Sociopsychological Theory of Ethics.* With an Introduction by Gardner Murphy. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. [1951?] xxvii, 530 pp. 25 s.

MUNK, ARTHUR W.: *History and God; Clues to His Purpose.* New York: The Ronald Press Company. [1952.] xi, 310 pp. $3.75.

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PIEPER, JOSEF: *Leisure the Basis of Culture.* Translated by Alexander Dru, with an Introduction by T. S. Eliot. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. [1952.] 169 pp. $2.75.

POTTHOF, H. R.: *Pan-psyche.* Zweite, verbesserte Auflage. Strasbourg: Editions P. H. Heitz. 1951. 130 pp.

First edition 1949, under the title: *Geheimnisse und Andeutungen.*

NOTES AND NEWS

Dr. Jerome Stolnitz of Colgate University has accepted appointment as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester.

A joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association will be held at the University of Birmingham, July 11-13, 1952. The program will include the Presidential Address by Professor A. E. Duncan-Jones on "Deadlock in Ethics," and symposia on "Seeming," "Men and Machines," "Reducibility," and "Motives and Causes."

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Some Neglected Philosophic Problems Regarding History. MAURICE MANDELBAUM.
What is Philosophy of History? LEWIS S. FEUER.
Historical Interpretation and Culture Analysis. HORACE L. FRIESS.
Comments on the Symposium "What is Philosophy of History?" STERLING P. LAMPRECHT, JOSÉ FERRATER-MORA, MAURICE MANDELBAUM.

No. 11. May 22, 1952.

Euthyphro, Mill, and Mr. Lewis. ALBERT L. HAMMOND.
The Passing of Privileged Uniqueness. FREDERIC SOMMERS.

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